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ALBION'S FATAL FLAWS*
DOUGLAS HAY'S ESSAY, "PROPERTY, AUTHORITY AND THE CRIMINAL
Law", which sounds the opening shot for the collection titled Album's
Fatal Tree, has attracted a huge following, especially outside specialist
legal history circles.1 Hay's main thesis is that some of the most
characteristic features of eighteenth-century English criminal pro-
cedure for cases of serious crime require to be understood as "a
ruling-class conspiracy" against the lower orders.2 In the present
article I shall show that when tested against detailed evidence of the
work of the felony courts, Hay's thesis appears fundamentally mis-
taken. (I shall not be discussing the other essays in the Albion vol-
ume.)
Although the Hay essay has several strands, in its most important
dimension it purports to explain a celebrated peculiarity of the crimi-
nal justice system of the eighteenth century, namely the large number
of offences punishable by death. The list of nominally capital offences
grew throughout the century;3 various authors reckon it at upwards
of 200 by the early nineteenth century, although that figure is bloated
in ways that I shall discuss later. In the actual administration of the
criminal law, however, capital punishment had been on the wane
since the sixteenth century, in tie sense that a declining proportion
of persons convicted of felony were executed. The puzzle is, why did
the "penal death rate"4 decline while the legislature was threatening
ever more capital punishment?
The conventional account of this paradox is Radzinowicz's.51 have
always found it fundamentally persuasive. I still do, and I shall return
to it at the end of this article. Hay offers quite a different explanation.
The widening gap between the expanding threats of death on one
* An earlier version of this paper was presented to the October 1981 meeting of the
American Society for Legal History. Suggestions and references from John Beattie,
J. S. Cockburn, G. R. Elton, Owen Fiss, George Fletcher, Lawrence Friedman,
Charles Gray, Thomas Green, Douglas Hay, R. H. Helmholz, Dennis Hutchinson,
Gareth Jones, P. J. R. King, Mark Kishlansky, David I-angiim, Norval Morris,
Richard Posner, A. W. B. Simpson, Lawrence Stone and John Styles are gratefully
acknowledged.
1 Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", in Douglas Hay,
Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson and Cal Winslow, Albion's Fatal
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London, 1975), pp. 17-63.
1 Ibid., p. 52
3 For various counts, see Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and
its Administration from IJSO, 4 vols. (London, 1948-68), i, pp. 3-4; but see p. 118
below.
4 The famous phrase of J. C. Jeaffreson, Middlesex County Records, 4 vols. (London,
1886-92), iii, p. xvii.
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hand and relatively infrequent imposition of the death penalty on the
other hand enhanced the discretion of the elite to decide whom to
execute and whom to spare. It was "a ruling-class conspiracy" to use
the criminal law in order to extract deference from the lower orders.
Hay detects this self-serving discretion throughout the main phases
of the criminal process — prosecution, trial, sentencing and executive
clemency.6
Hay does not seriously claim to have identified a conspiracy in the
conventional sense of the term, that is, an agreement to promote
unlawful or wicked ends. Rather, he says, the plot was one in which
"the common assumptions of the conspirators lay so deep that they
were never questioned, and rarely made explicit" .7 This way of speak-
ing directs attention away from the mechanism of class concert, which
the essay hardly clarifies, and towards the supposed object, emphas-
ized incessantly, of class domination and oppression ("the law . . .
allowed the rulers of England to make the courts a selective instru-
ment of class justice . . .").8
I think that a critic interested in broad questions of Marxist his-
torical method might take a stern view of so ambiguous a notion of
conspiracy, but that is not my mission. Still less do I wish to bring
the general tenets of Marxist theory into question. It is true that I am
criticizing a Marxist work, and that my own predilections are non-
Marxist, but my critique would be largely unaffected if I were to
assume that Marx and his followers have correctly characterized the
main movements in Western social and political history. Even the
most dedicated Marxist would concede that there is a variety of sub-
jects on which Marxist historical method does not throw much light
— the history of climatic changes, the invention of the flush toilet,
or what have you. In this article I shall be saying that the aspects of
eighteenth-century English criminal procedure emphasized in the
Hay essay belong on that list of subjects. The criminal law and its
procedures existed to serve and protect the interests of the people




I shall develop this view by drawing on data from a group of 171
cases conducted at four sessions of the Old Bailey during the years
6 Prosecution: "it was in the hands of the gentleman who went to law to evoke
gratitude as well as fear in the maintenance of deference" (Hay, "Property, Authority
and the Criminal Law", p. 41). Trial: "The nature of the criminal trial gave enormous
discretion to men of property . . . [in addition to] the prosecutor" (ibid., p. 42).
Sentencing: character evidence from "employers, respectable farmers and neighbouring
gentlemen" might "induce the judge to pass a lesser sentence, or recommend a pardon
(ibid., p. 42). Clemency: the pardon process "epitomizes the discretionary element of
the law . . ." (ibid., p. 43).
1 Ibid., p. 52
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from 1754 to 1756. The data comes from a study being published
elsewhere, which is devoted to reconstructing and establishing the
reliability of a pair of sources that supply narrative accounts of what
was happening at these criminal trials.9 One source is a set of judge's
notes — that is, courtroom minutes of evidence and jury instructions
— taken down by Sir Dudley Ryder, chief justice of King's Bench,
who sat at the Old Bailey for these four sessions and actually presided
over the trial of 44 of the 171 cases. Like his brethren on the common
law bench, Ryder served intermittently as a trial judge at the Old
Bailey. His notes are exceptionally detailed by comparison with others
that survive for the period, for the simple reason that Ryder knew
shorthand. As a youth he had mastered one of the standard shorthand
systems of the day. His Old Bailey notes, as well as a diary of his
assize notes that Hay used in his essay10 and that I shall also draw
upon, have been transcribed into typescript by a cipher expert.
The four Old Bailey sessions at which Ryder sat during his brief
judicial career were also the subject of a series of contemporary pam-
phlet reports, now called the Old Bailey Sessions Papers.u The pam-
phlets were prepared for a lay readership and sold on the streets of
London immediately after the trials. I have written about their origins
and characteristics in an article published a few years ago.12 The
pamphlets continue to be the main source for the detail of the criminal
trials that I shah1 be discussing for the Ryder years. The Ryder notes
both confirm the reliability of what the pamphlets report and add
detail, especially legal detail, that the pamphlets bleached out.
In emphasizing a two-year period from mid-century I run the usual
risk of sampling error, and I shall be unable to correct adequately for
developments later in the century. (The Hay essay also relies heavily
but not entirely on mid-century sources.) The main objection to
basing a critique of Hay's essay on Old Bailey sources is that London
was uniquely urban, whereas Hay's essay blends provincial and Lon-
don sources. To be sure, we do see less sheep-stealing and more
shop-lifting in London than we would find in Lancashire. Fortu-
' JohnH. Langbein, "Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from
the Ryder Sources", Univ. of Chicago Law Rev. ,1(1983). The Ryder Old Bailey Notes
appear as Document no. 14 of the transcribed notebooks. The manuscript and a copy
of the typescript are deposited in Lincoln's Inn. The manuscript diary (hereafter Ryder
Assize Diary) is transcribed as Document no. i<Kf)> volume 1129 of the Harrowby
Manuscripts, Sandon Hall. Copies of both typescripts have also been deposited at the
University of Chicago Law School Library.
10 Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", pp. 28-9.
1' During the Ryder years the pamphlets were published in London eight times a
year, usually in two parts, and bear the title The Proceedings on the King's Commissions
of the Peace, Over and Terminer, and Gaol Delivery for the City of London; and also the
Gaol Delivery for the County of Middlesex, Held at Justice-Hall in the Old-Bailey (here-
after Old Bailey Sessions Papers).
12 John H. Langbein, "The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers", Univ. of Chicago
LawRev.,xlv (1978), pp. 263,,267-72. For further discussion, see Langbein, "Shaping
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nately, when such issues arise in this paper, I shall be able to refer to
the findings for provincial Essex contained in a splendid paper by
P. J. R. King.13 It should also be observed that English criminal
procedure was very much a national system. Although a few details
of Old Bailey practice were peculiar,14 the fundamental principles
applied equally in the metropolis and in the provinces. However
much the clientele differed, the procedural institutions were shared.
So were the royal judges who sat in turns at the Old Bailey and rode
the assize circuits. In 1755, for example, Dudley Ryder presided on
the Northern Circuit in March, at the Old Bailey in April, on the
Home Circuit in August, and back at the Old Bailey in October.
II
OFFENCES AND OFFENDERS
Prosecutions for felony in the eighteenth century were for offences
that had been felony for centuries before. The law that the courts had
occasion to enforce in the eighteenth century was not for the most
part the law that the contemporary legislature was enacting. An item-
ization of the offences in my sample for 1754-6, representing four
months' worth of ah1 the cases of serious crime prosecuted in the
metropolis, will provide a convenient illustration of the actual busi-
ness in the court of capital jurisdiction. (See Table.)
The prosaic nature of these offences will come as a surprise to
readers who have taken seriously Hay's preoccupation with such
legislation as that against food riots and work-place insurrections.15
In my data we do not see offences that exemplify the advance of
pre-industrial capitalism. Virtually all of the offences had been fel-
onious back into the middle ages, a point Hay has lately acknowledged
in another context in an article in this journal.16 Most of the offences
13 P. J. R. King, "Decision-Makers and Decision-Making in the 18th Century
Criminal Law: The Social Groups Involved in the Punishment of Property Offenders
and the Criteria on Which Their Decisions Were Based" (typescript, March 1981).
King's paper, still unpublished, was presented to a conference at the University of
Kent, Canterbury, in April 1981.
14 For example, (1) the Old Bailey sat eight times a year, provincial assizes twice;
(2) the Old Bailey had a permanent judge, the Recorder of London, as well as rotating
common law judges like Ryder; the recorder pronounced sentence and conveyed
recommendations for clemency to the monarch on behalf of the court; (3) the pre-trial
process that culminated in trial before the Old Bailey was more systematic, on account
of the work of the quasi-official "court justice" (J.P.) for Middlesex and the institution
of "the sitting Alderman" in the City.
15 See Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", pp. 20-1: "the class that
controlled Parliament was using the criminal sanction to enforce two of the radical
redefinitions of property which gentlemen were making in their own interests during
the eighteenth century .
•« Douglas Hay, "War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record
of the English Courts", Past and Present, no. 95 (May 1982), p. 146: "In spite of the
flood of new capital statutes that followed the Restoration, most capital prosecutions
continued to be made under Tudor legislation. In the years considered here, 1742 to
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were only nominally capital, as benefit of clergy pertained and re-
duced the sanction from death to transportation.17
TABLE
OFFENCES PROSECUTED AT DUDLEY RYDER'S FOUR OLD BAILEY
SESSIONS 1754-1756*
Homicide 3





Theft from lodgings, inns, pubs 15
Domestic theft 10
Theft from work-places or employers 13
Other theft, 40s. or over 15
Other theft, under 40s. 53
Receiving stolen goods 13
Forging a will 1
Aiding a gaol-break 1
Assault and robbery 2
Perjury and abuse of legal process 3
* Notes and sources: Offences prosecuted October 1754, April and October 1755,
and April 1756, the four sessions at which Dudley Ryder was among the trial com-
missioners. Offences are categorized in the Table in lay terms; each has been tabulated
as originally charged, although juries returned lesser offences or acquitted outright in
many. When a case involves multiple charges, only the most serious has been tabulated,
in order to avoid double counting. In eight cases involving multiple defendants the
court tried separate indictments for receiving stolen goods simultaneously with the
related larceny cases, which accounts for the discrepancy between 171 trials and 179
offences. Ryder Old Bailey Notes, pp. 1-62; Old Bailey Sessions Papers (Oct. 1754,
Apr., Oct. 1755, Apr. 1756). See nn. 9, 11 above.
It is very hard to find figures worthy of romance, even social ro-
mance, among the shop-lifters, pickpockets, pilfering housemaids
and dishonest apprentices who populated the Old Bailey dock. To be
sure, most of them were poor, as criminals tend to be. Anatole France
made the most of that in a famous utterance. "The law [of France]",
he said, "in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor
to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread".18
Actually, to the extent that our sources let us see anything about the
economic circumstances of the persons accused, we can say that the
culprits tried at the Old Bailey are seldom destitute. Some plead
hunger or say they are unemployed, but in the main we see employed
persons who have yielded to temptation rather than necessity. To
(n. 16 ami.)
1802, at least 95 per cent of the 450 capital charges tried at Staffordshire assizes were
based on statutes enacted before 1742 . (The main Tudor legislation that Hay has in
mind supplied statutory basis for offences that had been common law felonies from
medieval times. Developments in benefit of clergy, discussed on p. 117 below, pre-
cipitated much of the Tudor legislation.)
17 Discussed on p. 117 below.
18 Anatole France, Le fys rouge (Paris, 1894), quoted in John Bartlett, Familiar
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turn these little crooks into class warriors one must wear rose-
coloured glasses of the deepest hue.
UI
PROSECUTION
If the criminals were often poor, their victims (whom we see serving
as private prosecutors in the Old Bailey trials) were not much better
off— a point that is played down in Hay's essay.19 In the Old Bailey
cases we often cross a class line when we move from the offender to
his victim, but not a class gulf. The victim is usually more propertied
than the person who victimized him, although often only slightly. I
have not hit upon a way of quantifying this, in part because infor-
mation about the social status of the victim is so haphazard in the Old
Bailey sources, but I think that anyone who studies a volume of the
Old Bailey Sessions Papers will conclude that the victims seldom
come from the propertied elite. They are typically small shopkeepers,
artisans, lodging-house keepers, innkeepers and so forth. Included
on the list of victim-prosecutors for the first dozen cases in the Octo-
ber 1754 sessions, for example, are a loom maker, a brass founder,
a wine merchant, and a pewterer, each prosecuting pilfering employ-
ees; a baker's servant and a journeyman tailor prosecuting thieving
prostitutes; a lodging-house keeper and a former room-mate prose-
cuting for the theft ,of furniture and domestic goods from lodgings;
and a calico printer who had been mugged on the street. Only one
— a major who prosecuted a stablehand for horse-stealing — fits
Hay's image with any ease.
King's data corroborates the Old Bailey sources in a helpful way.
He has worked with Essex quarter sessions records, mostly recogni-
zances in which descriptions of the victims appear fairly regularly. I
stress, as King does, that there are important differences between
cases triable at quarter sessions on the one hand and at assizes or the
Old Bailey on the other hand; in particular, the felonies tried at
quarter sessions were non-capital, that is, petty larceny. Neverthe-
less, it is very telling that King's tabulations of the occupational status
of prosecutors for the period 1760-1800 show that "Around 90% of
these prosecutors came from three groups — the farmers, the trades-
men and artisans, and the labourers".20 King further points to the
works of Brewer and Styles and of David Philips, both published
19 Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", p. 37: "The poor suffer from
theft as well as the rich, and in eighteenth-century England probably far more poor
men lost goods to thieves, if only because the rich were few and their property more
secure".
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after the Hay essay, which reach similar conclusions.21 Prosecution
was not a preserve of the ruling class.
Indeed, one of the main themes in the history of the administration
of the criminal law in the second half of the eighteenth century was
the effort to encourage prosecutorial activity by the lower orders. In
one sense this is a development that traces back to the 1690s, when
parliament began to enact the statutes that offered rewards for suc-
cessful prosecution of certain heinous felonies, including highway
robbery, burglary, housebreaking and horse-stealing.22 In the 1750s
the campaign waged by Henry Fielding to obtain a subsidy for ex-
penses for poor prosecutors and witnesses came to fruition in legis-
lation of 1752 and 1754,23 and we know from Dudley Ryder's assize
diary that the statutes were being put to use. He tells us that it had
become the convention to award five shillings per day in expenses,
and in one case he reports that he refused an award to an innkeeper
who seemed too prosperous.24
In disputing Hay's version of the prosecutorial process — that "it
was in the hands of the gentleman who went to law to evoke gratitude
as well as fear in the maintenance of deference" — I have been arguing
that gentlemen prosecutors were few and far between. I want also to
take modest exception to the notion that since prosecution was pri-
vate, a potential prosecutor had the discretion to threaten it in self-
serving ways. In fact, various factors worked to circumscribe the
prosecutor's discretion.
The most endemic aspect of what one might call prosecutorial dis-
cretion is the phenomenon of non-reporting of crime. We are all
familiar with the recent discussion about whether increases in re-
ported instances of rape reflect increased incidence of the offence, or
lessened aversion to reporting it. When we deal with grand larceny,
which in all its forms was the predominant eighteenth-century felony,
we can be sure that a victim who chose to forgive an offender by not
reporting the crime could seldom be stopped. But this was hardly a
21 Ibid., pp . 3 , 12, citing John Brewer and John Styles, An Ungovernable People:
The English and their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London, 1980),
Introduction, pp . 18-19; David Philips, Crime and Authority in Victorian England: The
Black Country, 1835-1860 (London, 1977), pp. 123-9.
22 See the convenient summary in Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Police of the
Metropolis, 7th edn. (London, 1806), pp . 390-2.
23 25 George II, c. 36,5. n (1752); 27 George II, c. 3, s. 3(1754). Hay has remarked
upon these and subsequent acts in his recent article, "War, Dearth and Theft in the
Eighteenth Century", pp. 147-8, but without attempt to reconcile the earner essay.
" Ryder Assize Diary, pp. 7, 13. Beanie reports that his "examination of about ten
years in the Surrey and Sussex assizes between the 1750s and 1780s reveals a range of
awards from about a pound (though one or two were as little as fifteen shillings) to as
much as ten pounds. A very large number were between one and two pounds, though
most were probably between two and three pounds": John M. Beattie, "Judiaal
Records and the Measurement of Crime in Eighteenth-Century England", in L. A.
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peculiarity of eighteenth-century English social structure. It is true
in today's Anglo-American legal systems and, indeed, in contempor-
ary socialist legal systems. The victim of the property crime has a
practical monopoly over disclosure of the offence. Every criminal
justice system must depend upon the self-interest of owners for the
enforcement of the laws protecting property.
Despite the nominally private character of prosecution in English
law, there were forces at work that limited prosecutorial discretion.
In homicide, of course, the coroner system largely eliminated it, be-
cause the coroner investigated every suspicious death. There was no
equally comprehensive approach to larceny. As a matter of statutory
design, the pre-trial binding-over system administered by the justices
of the peace purported to limit prosecutorial discretion by requiring
the J.P. to bind over to trial "all such . . . as do declare anything
material to prove the . . . Felony . . .".2S Yet this scheme assumed,
in the language of the statute, a victim willing to "bring" the accu-
sation to the attention of the J.P. There is good reason to think that
many potential prosecutors did not bring charges. In his famous essay
of 1751, Henry Fielding, who was campaigning to increase the levels
of prosecution, stresses that potential prosecutors were either too
forgiving or else too necessitous to take the time and incur the expense
and nuisance of prosecuting.26 Among his complaints Fielding did
not find room for the abuse that Hay treats as central: affluent victims
supposedly manipulating the prosecutorial power in a self-serving
manner.
There were aspects of the pre-trial system that limited the discre-
tion of a victim in not reporting to the J.P. Whenever the victim
needed the J.P. to help him recover stolen goods — for example, by
issuing search or arrest warrants, or by granting immunity from pros-
ecution in order to obtain accomplice disclosures — the J.P. had
notice and was able to bind over. These pre-trial investigative steps
are frequently evidenced in the Old Bailey cases in my sample, al-
though of course I have no way of identifying the dark figure of
unreported events.
When the J.P. did bind over, it was usually on pain of a hefty fine
for the prosecutor's non-appearance. Such recognizances survive for
most of the Old Bailey trials of the mid-i75os; typically the penal
sum they impose is twenty pounds. In the London Record Office
papers for the April 1754 sessions there is a pitiful deposition from
a shopkeeper, Moses Smith, who had been "bound [over] to prose-
cute and give Evidence" against an accused for feloniously stealing
a handkerchief out of Smith's shop. Smith explains "that he was
25 2 & 3 Phil ip & Mary, c. 10 (1555) .
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taken ill about a fortnight before the [trial, with] a violent Fever
which continued for several weeks". Smith sent two of his sureties
to the lord mayor's clerk to report the problem; the clerk replied that
Smith should have his wife attend the trial in his place. "But", the
deposition continues, "the said Smith being then so dangerously ill
and keeping no Servant [n]or having any person to attend his Shop
but his Wife,. . . she could not leave her husband at that time with-
out subjecting him to great Danger". The document concludes with
a recital that Smith "did not neglect attending the Sessions with any
design to let the [accused] escape any punishment which might have
been inflicted on him had he been prosecuted . . .".27 This picture
of a wretched little shopkeeper and his wife, too poor to be able to
hire someone to relieve them on the day of the trial, and now terrified
of the fine for non-prosecution, contrasts strongly with the notion of
unbounded prosecutorial discretion.
Finally, I should advert to another dimension of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, which concerns the decision not of whether to prosecute, but
on what charge. Ordinary grand larceny was subject to benefit of
clergy, meaning in practice that first-time offenders would be trans-
ported rather than executed. However, many (perhaps most) prop-
erty offences could be characterized as something more than ordinary
grand larceny. A variety of statutes dealing with thefts from the per-
son, from dwelling houses and shops, and on the highway, withdrew
benefit of clergy when these larcenies involved goods above particular
amounts. The issue that I do not yet understand is how prosecutors
arrived at the decision of whether to invoke these special statutes
when the facts permitted. In some of the Old Bailey cases it is clear
that the indictment itself down-values the goods, or neglects to charge
an aggravating circumstance — for example, that the offence was
committed in a dwelling house or a shop. In other cases when such
matters are charged, or fully charged, we see juries down-valuing the
goods or refusing to find the aggravating circumstance, in order to
make the offence clergyable and spare the culprit from the capital
sanction. The patterns of indictment down-charging seem sufficiently
recurrent that we may doubt whether there was much room for pros-
ecutorial caprice. I suspect that the J.P.s and the clerks of assize and
their Old Bailey counterparts had an important hand in advising pros-
ecutors how to charge,28 and that they were guided primarily by their
sense of what verdicts juries were customarily prepared to return in
various circumstances.
2 7 Corporation of London Record Office, Sessions Papers, April 1754 Sessions, loose
document, unnumbered, commencing "Moses Smith of Aldersgate . . .".
2 8 In the case of Thomas Rolf, discussed on pp. m - 1 2 below, the prosecutrix
testified that she thought the money stolen from her amounted to more than eight
shillings, but she valued the sum at five shillings on the advice of the court justice,
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I concede, although the actual evidence for it is thin, that 61ite
victims must have been treated with greater courtesy, and allowed
greater prosecutorial discretion, than victims like Moses Smith who
came from lower social orders. Hay points to a single case, evidenced
in the diary of a Lancashire squire, in which both the accused thief
and the squire-prosecutor behave as though the prosecutor retains a
power of non-prosecution, even though the prosecutor had used the
J.P.s of Liverpool to obtain a search warrant and to conduct a pre-
trial examination of the accused.29 If we assume that this was not an
aberration, it shows us only that the prosecutorial system was not an
engine of egalitarianism. Of course, the prosecutorial system of so
stratified a society will be sensitive to the patterns of deference that
otherwise pervade the society. What I resist is the idea that such
practices justify treating the prosecutorial system as having been con-
structed for the purpose of furthering the class interests of the &ite.
It is one thing to avoid conflict with the privileged orders, another
thing to promote class aims.
The whole of the criminal justice system, especially the prosecu-
torial system, was primarily designed to protect the people, over-
whelmingly non-61ite, who suffered from crime. One can argue, as
I am prepared to, that it was a great error on the part of the English
to attempt to perpetuate a system of private prosecution and private
policing from a medieval setting, where it may have made sense, to
the changed circumstances of a more urban and impersonal
eighteenth-century society. That was part of a set of constitutional
convictions that contemporaries held deeply, even though in retro-
spect their concern looks to have been misplaced. Within the confines
of a system that lacked professional prosecution, steps were taken to
make the system serve the interests of the non-£lite prosecutors who
predominated. They were aided and afforced by the J.P.s, and in
some cases subsidized and rewarded for prosecutorial efforts. Ac-
cordingly, I would venture to predict that when we finally obtain a
satisfactory history of the prosecutorial system of the eighteenth cent-




Whereas Hay has exaggerated the extent of prosecutorial discre-
tion, he has underemphasized the importance of jury discretion. I
had occasion above to refer to the role of juries in down-valuing goods
or returning what we today call a "lesser included offence". I shall
29 Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", p. 41 n. 2, citing BlundeWs
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follow John Beattie in calling both phenomena by the label of "partial
verdict". Acquittals and partial verdicts receive short shrift in Hay's
essay. I shall dwell on them because I think that his theory of
ruling-class conspiracy is impossible to reconcile with the reality of
jury discretion.
Beattie has computed for the period 1736-53 that about 10 per cent
of the bills submitted to the Surrey grand jury in urban cases of capital
crime were dismissed.30 I am concerned with the second jury, the
trial or petty jury. Beattie has computed that the petty juries acquitted
in a third of the capital cases in which the Surrey grand juries had
indicted; in another 30 per cent the petty juries returned partial ver-
dicts.31 My figures for the Old Bailey are in accord. The 171 cases
produced 203 accused, of whom 84 were acquitted. I have not tabu-
lated the frequency with which juries down-valued or convicted of
lesser offences for the whole of my sample; in the October 1754 ses-
sions, for which I do have the figures, of 31 guilty verdicts 14 involved
these two types of partial verdict.
Both the acquittals and the partial verdicts follow patterns that are
principled and predictable. When our sources give us narrative ac-
counts of the trials we see that acquittals are usually returned in cases
in which the evidence falls short of the standard of proof that was
understood to be appropriate in criminal cases. Virtually all cases in
which there was only a single accusing witness resulted in acquittal,
as did cases in which the identification of the accused was put in any
serious doubt.
The partial verdicts are especially interesting, because they were
in truth sentencing decisions. They usually had the effect of reducing
the sentence from death to transportation; in the relatively few cases
in which the goods were valued below a shilling, the effect was to
reduce the sentence from transportation to whipping. The striking
aspect of the partial verdict practice in the cases in my sample is its
regularity, hence predictability. In ah* cases of highway robbery and
livestock theft in which juries convicted, they convicted capitally.
They returned capital verdicts in most cases of burglary. Otherwise,
juries applied what should be called a strong presumption against
capital verdicts, a presumption that would be overcome when the
circumstances were especially audacious. Old Bailey juries were harsh
on professional or gang criminals, which is scarcely surprising in the
setting of London's amateurish law enforcement. Capital verdicts for
shop-lifting and for theft from a dwelling house usually occurred in
cases with gang overtones, often involving multiple offences and re-
quiring the evidence of an accomplice-turned-crown-witness.
3 0 John M. Beattie, "Crime and the Courts in Surrey, 1736-1753", i n j . S .Cockbum
(ed.) , Crime in England, isso-1800 (Princeton, 1977), pp. 155, 163.
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If I were going to organize a ruling-class conspiracy to use the
criminal law to terrorize the lower orders, I would not interpose
autonomous bodies of non-conspirators like the petty juries. If, on
the other hand, I were going to reckon the jurors among my con-
spirators, I would be troubled that they were so predictably humane
by the standards of the day.
I find Hay's account of the jury baffling. He wants to make the
jurors co-conspirators. He says: "All men of property knew that
judges, justices [of the peace] and juries had to be drawn from their
own ranks".32 This is not a considered statement, because it assimi-
lates men of great wealth and station to the same "ranks" as those
who satisfied the ten-pound-a-year minimum juror qualification.33 In
the Reverend Martin Madan's Thoughts on Executive Justice, a source
several times cited by Hay, the author worries that petty jurors at
assizes are receiving inadequate instruction from the judge, "as they
usually consist of low and ignorant country people!".34 In his paper
on the enforcement of the game laws, Hay points out that the farmers
and tradesmen who were the typical jurors had interests different
from those of the propertied elite.35 From an Elizabethan sample
Samaha has reported finding "ordinary people in the town — petty
tradesmen such as alehouse keepers and occasionally even day
labourers" sitting on trial juries at Colchester assizes, and he con-
cludes: "To send a suspect to the gallows . . . required the concur-
rence of every segment in the community, since they were all repre-
sented at various stages of the criminal process . . .".36 It hardly
seems tenable for Hay to align petty jurors with the English social
elite.
Hay is also on weak ground when he conjectures: "A panel of the
poor would not convict a labourer who stole wood from a lord's park,
a sheep from a farmer's fold, or corn from a merchant's yard". Al-
though Hay is careful to say that he does not think that the juries of
32 Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", p. 38.
" The art of 4 & 5 William Be Mary, c. 24, s. 15 (1692) fixed the juror qualification
at ten pounds a year for England, six pounds for Wales; ss. 18-19 set the sum for
talesman at five pounds for England and three for Wales. For the city of London the
art of 3 George II, c. 25, ss. 19-20 (1730) imposed a hundred-pound qualification. An
art of4 George II, c. 7,s. 3(1731) qualified for jury service in Middlesex men possessed
of leaseholds of fifty pounds per year, apparently in recognition of the prevalence of
leasehold conveyancing. These acts are treated as governing in the 1766 edition of Giles
Duncomb, Trials per Pais: or, The Law of England Concerning Juries by Nisi Prius, 8th
edn. (London, 1766), pp. n o , 162-4.
34 Martin Madan, Thoughts on Executive Justice, with Respect to the Criminal Laws,
Particularly on the Circuits, 2nd edn. (London, 1785), p. 148. In his recent "War,
Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century", p. 154 and n. 100, Hay states the point
somewhat more softly, saying that "at quarter sessions and assizes trial jurors were
drawn from a much higher social class than most of those indicted for theft".
35 Douglas Hay, "Poaching and the Game Laws on Cannock Chase", in Hay a al.,
Albion's Fatal Tree, pp . 189, 211 .
36 Joel B. Samaha, "Hanging for Felony: The Rule of Law in Elizabethan Colches-
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the day "convicted against the evidence", he speculates that "a more
democratic jury might not have convicted at all".37 I doubt whether
the English poor of the eighteenth century generally condoned the
theft of livestock and victuals, and Hay does not produce evidence
that they did. Empirical study of twentieth-century juries in the
United States — juries long since democratized and freed of property
qualifications — squarely contradicts the notion that they are hostile
to the law of larceny.38
We may come close to understanding how Hay went astray if we
reflect upon a passage such as this, in which Hay takes it for granted
that the criminal law lacked the adherence of the lower orders. To be
sure, there were corners of the criminal law that did not command
universal regard. The source of Hay's undoing, I suspect, is that the
only part of the substantive criminal law with which he was deeply
acquainted when he wrote his essay was the uniquely class-based and
arbitrary game law. There certainly was popular dissatisfaction with
the game law (and not confined to the poor),39 but to extrapolate from
that bizarre scheme (most of it misdemeanour) to the whole of the
law of felony would be a grievous error, just as it would be folly in
our own day to equate public attitudes towards marijuana offences
and, say, automobile theft. When Hay speaks indifferently of stealing
wood from a lord's park and sheep from a farmer's fold, he is making
that sort of error. The property crimes that were of major conse-
quence in the workload of eighteenth-century criminal courts — in
particular the theft of livestock, shop goods, and personal and house-
hold belongings — were those about whose blameworthiness there
was a moral consensus that knew no class lines. That is why men of
the non-e"lite could predominate (as prosecutors and jurors) in con-
victing persons who committed property crimes.
V
JUDGES
The royal judges who presided at assize and Old Bailey trials for
felony were certainly e"lite figures. The trial judge had a variety of
means of influencing the verdict of the jury, especially through his
powers to comment on the evidence and to instruct the jurors on the
37 Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", pp. 38-9.
M Harry Kalven Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston, 1966), pp. 76-7.
39 It would be a mistake to think that hostility to the game laws followed any line
between elite and non-ilite. Blackstone, for example, who thought the game laws "of
so questionable a nature", implied derisively that the "false grammar" of one of the
statutes reflected on those who promojed the cause: William Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws ofEngland, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1765-9), iv, pp. 174-5. See also P. B. Munsche,
Gentlemen and Poachers: The English Game Lava, 1671-18ji (Cambridge, 1981); P. B.
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law.40 The limits on judicial influence must, however, be understood.
Since there was as yet virtually no diversion of felony cases away from
trial by jury, all those open-and-shut cases went to jury trial that
would today be processed in short-form procedures such as plea bar-
gaining or trial "by the bench" (that is, by judges sitting without
juries).41 Accordingly, most cases that went to jury trial in the eight-
eenth century involved evidence so overwhelming that conviction was
a certainty, there was no room for influence. Further, when jurors
deferred to judges, it was because jurors understood that judges spoke
from wisdom and experience about matters of legal principle. If the
jurors had suspected the judges of abusing their authority in order to
promote 61ite interests, jurors would not have been so ready to follow
the judges' lead. The history of bitter judge/jury antagonism in the
seditious libel cases later in the century should stand as warning
enough against the notion that judges could command jury verdicts
by fiat.42 When the sources for the Old Bailey cases permit us to see
what the judges were saying to the juries, it seems largely dictated by
the state of the facts or the law.
Hay's boldest theme concerns the supposed discretion of the judges
in post-verdict proceedings, that is, in sentencing and clemency mat-
ters. In the modern world we are accustomed to judges having a
broad, explicit discretion to fix sentences, but that was a nine-
teenth-century development. In the eighteenth century the English
judge had no direct power to choose between death and trans-
portation for felony convicts.43 The jury, however, did — through
the power that it exercised so vigorously of returning a partial verdict
that reduced a non-clergyable offence to a clergyable one. Hay is
correct to stress that the trial judge had considerable influence over
the process by which convicts might receive executive clemency after
sentencing. The pardon process is best understood as an adjunct to
the sentencing system, compensating for the lack of direct judicial
discretion. The secretaries of state and the monarch regularly de-
ferred to the judges on pardon matters.44
4 0 Langbein, "Criminal Trial before the Lawyers", pp. 284-300.
4 1 See John H. Langbein, "Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining",
Law and Society Rev., xiii (1979), p. 261.
4 2 See Thomas A. Green, The Jury, Seditious Libel, and the Criminal Law (forthcom-
ing William Andrews Clark Memorial Lib. ser., Univ. of California at Los Angeles).
4 3 The statute of 4 George I, c. 11 (1717) that had made transportation the regular
sanction for clergyable offences did preserve to the judge the option to impose the
lesser sanction of branding, and there are a couple of cases in which that happens in
the Dudley Ryder sources under discussion. I should say that I do not understand
what conventions may have been prevailing in respect of that seldom-used option. I
suspect that a larger sample would show that a disproportionate number of these cases
involved married women or gainfully employed fathers—cases in which transportation
would have worked hardship on the family (and, perhaps, on the ratepayers as well).
4 4 When the trial judges initiated pardon requests, the monarch granted them
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"Roughly half of those condemned to death during the eighteenth
century did not go to the gallows", Hay writes, "but were transported
to the colonies or imprisoned".45 Data published in 1772 by Theodore
Stephen Janssen, who had served as mayor of London in 1755, dis-
closes that for the 23 mayoral years 1749-71 some 443 capital convicts
were reprieved (or died in gaol) out of a total of 1,121 sentenced to
death at the Old Bailey. Of these 443 who escaped execution, 401
were pardoned for transportation. One indication that these pardons
were not awarded capriciously, but with a view to considerations of
principle, is that pardon rates varied with the gravity of the offence.
Of the 81 persons convicted of murder in Janssen's figures, 72 were
executed; of 17 for attempted murder, 15 were executed; of 362 for
highway robbery, 251 were executed; of 208 for house-breaking, 118
were executed. By contrast, only 6 of the 23 persons convicted of
shop-lifting above the clergyable limit were allowed to hang; 22 of 90
for livestock thefts; 27 of 80 for stealing privately (picking pockets);
27 of 63 for stealing from a dwelling house in an amount above the
clergyable sum; and neither of the two condemned sodomites.46
What factors were motivating the commutations and pardons? Hay
notices that "The grounds for mercy were ostensibly that the offence
was minor, or that the convict was of good character, or that the crime
he had committed was not common enough in that county to require
(m 44 com.)
mentary committee in 1819: "The judges send what are called 'circuit letters' to the
secretary of state, stating the places where prisoners have been convicted, their of-
fences, and in general the favourable circumstances that have appeared, that would
make a case proper to be recommended to His Majesty, for his pardon; and I do not
remember any case in which such pardon was refused when recommended": Report
from the Select Committee Appointed to Consider of So Much of the Criminal Law as
Relates to Capital Punishment in Felonies, Parliamentary Papers (1819), viii, p. 48. The
Recorder of London prepared an equivalent document for each Old Bailey sessions;
for an example from one of the four sessions at which Dudley Ryder sat, see Public
Record Office, London (hereafter P.R.O.), S.P. 36/132/296 (Apr. 1755 sessions).
When the convict or a supporter petitioned for clemency, as in the case of Richard
Tickner discussed on p. 112 and n. 54 below, the secretaries of state and often the
monarch reviewed the merits of the case.
43 Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", p. 43.
46 Stephen Theodore Janssen, This Sheet Contains Three Tables, from 1749 to 1771
(London, 1772; Guildhall Lib., London, B'side 27.15). The broadside is reprinted as
a foldout appendix in the endpapers of John Howard, An Account of the Principal
Lazarettos in Europe, 2nd edn. (London, 1791).
It is interesting to note that Janssen emphasizes in this compilation the theme to
which John Beanie and now Hay, in his "war, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth
Century", have been directing recent scholarly attention, namely the seeming con-
nection between rising crime rates and demobilization of die forces following periods
of war. Janssen says: It is worth observing that, as a great many idle Men and Lads
are taken into the Sea & Land Service during a war; so we then find the Gangs of
Robbers soon broken & that the Business at the Old Bailey gradually diminished to
half its duration in time of Peace, nor are half the number of Criminals condemned.
For in some Years of war they have not amounted to 20, whereas in Peace they have
arisen to 70,80, and 90. It is farther observable that at the conclusion of a War, through
very bad Policy, when we turn adrift so many thousand Men, great numbers fall
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an exemplary hanging",47 but Hay thinks that these grounds formed
a mere smoke-screen. The judges "were not usually willing to antag-
onize a body of respectable [local] feeling", he writes. The pardon
system was "capricious"; indeed, "the claims of class saved far more
men who had been left to hang by the assize judge than did the claims
of humanity".48 In support of this view Hay offers the evidence of a
few cases in which 6h'te petitioners referred to the previous good
character of the accused and especially to the good repute of his
family.
Although my main objection to this line of argument is that it is
unrepresentative, I want to say in passing that I would not accept the
implication that such factors ought to have been extraneous to what
were in effect sentencing decisions. In an age before probation and
large-scale penal imprisonment, the existence of family and employ-
ment relationships was highly relevant to the decision whether or not
to release an offender into the community (or, likewise, whether or
not to turn him loose on the inhabitants of Virginia and Maryland by
transporting him). Even today, if a convict can get respectable people
to support him, sentencing officers are inclined to give weight to that
evidence on the ground that it has predictive value on the question
of the likelihood of successful resocialization.
Hay's account of the clemency system highlights the peripheral
issue of social class and neglects to explore the factors that were of
central importance. The Ryder notebooks give us a good window on
this question, and the picture we see bears no resemblance to Hay's.
Ryder is preoccupied with the merits in clemency questions, and he
resists recommendations that involve only 61ite connections.
In the Old Bailey notebook there is one striking example, the case
of Thomas Rolf, convicted of highway robbery at the October 1754
sessions and sentenced to death. The evidence indicated that Rolf,
who had been apprehended at the scene, had behaved politely and
apologetically to his victim as he robbed her. He told her that desti-
tution led him to his crime. He was unable to find work and his wife
was about to deliver their third child.49 Ryder records in his notes
that he urged the jury to convict, since "compassion could not justify
finding contrary to truth", but after they heeded this instruction and
found him guilty, the jurors "desired I would intercede for him. I
said the Recorder [of London] would have an opportunity of repre-
senting it fully to His Majesty. [This is a reference to the recorder's
regular report to the monarch after each Old Bailey sessions.] And
indeed I never in all my life met with a robbery on the highway so
clearly proved to be the effect of mere necessity and committed for
4 7 Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", p. 43 (my italics).
4 8 Ibid., pp. 43-4.
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want of necessaries to maintain himself, wife big with child, and two
infants".50 Ryder made this notation with a view towards advising
the recorder, and Rolf thereafter received a free pardon,51 that is one
not conditioned on transportation or some other sanction, even
though the crown had to pay the prosecutrix the statutory forty-
pound reward for apprehending and convicting him.52
Ryder's assize diary for the summer 1754 sittings on the Home
Circuit contains considerable mention of his practice regarding ju-
dicial reprieve, reprieve being the decisive first step towards executive
commutation. At Guildford assizes he noted that he let two burglars
hang because "It was a very plain and bad case", but he reprieved a
horsethief "because the evidence doubtful", a sheepthief "because
the evidence not clear", and a pickpocket against whom the evidence
amounted in Ryder's view "not quite [to] a clear case".53
At the same assizes Ryder resisted 61ite intervention for clemency
in two cases of highway robbery. Richard Gilbert "was recommended
to reprieve by Creswick and Andrews his master, being but 20 years
old, but being for highway [robbery, and Gilbert having been con-
victed of two offences committed the same day, I] did not reprieve
him". In the case of Richard Tickner, Ryder refused to reprieve
although requested to do so by Arthur Onslow the Speaker of the
House of Commons, Richard Onslow the lord lieutenant of Surrey,
and Henry Talbot the high sheriff of Surrey. Arthur Onslow went to
the king; Ryder's opinion was sought, and he records it thus: since
"there was no reason to doubt [that Tickner had committed the crime]
and there were no circumstances of alleviation, I could not take on
myself to say he was an object of mercy . . .".54 The king let him
5 0 Ryder Old Bailey Notes , pp. 21-2.
5 1 OldBaiUy Sessions Papers (Jan. 1755), p . 80.
3 2 P .R .O. , T.53/45, M o n e y B 0 0 ^ P- 353-
5 3 Ryder Assize Diary, pp. 17-18.
54 Ibid. Both Onslow's letter and Ryder's reply survive in the State Papers. Onslow
wrote that Tickner, condemned "for a Robbery on the highway of some few shillings",
was "a young Man of a very honest Family with us, and for the saving of whose life
I am so much importuned, that I cannot avoid troubling your Lordship [the secretary
of state] with an humble request for your assistance in obtaining a reprieve for him,
in order to his transportation for any time, be the length of it what it will": P .R.O. ,
S.P. 36/128/67 (3 Sept. 1754). Ryder's reply recites that a copy of Onslow's letter had
been transmitted to him. Ryder reports on the evidence that had been adduced at
Tickner's trial, remarking that the victim testified that Tickner "came up to him,
presented a Pistol to his Breast & demanded his Money with a Curse, which on the
Second like demand he delivered him to the amount of 14 Shillings". Ryder also
reports that three pistols were found on Tickner when he was taken, and that he
initially refused to identify himself. He concludes: "On the Whole, as I see no Reason
to doubt of the Truth of the Fact, & no circumstances appeared to alleviate the guilt
of it, I cannot take on my Self to represent him as an object of your Majesty's Mercy.
But if your Majesty out of your great clemency shall be graciously pleased to extend
your Royal Mercy to him, I humbly Submit it to your Majesty's wisdom whether it
may not be on the Terms of Transportation for Life [as opposed to the seven or
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hang. At Horsham assizes a few days earlier Ryder sentenced to death
a man named Millet for horse-stealing. His diary records: "The clerk
of assizes pressed me much to transport Millet, the hosteller, but I
refused it because it seems to have been his practice [that is, he was
a multiple offender], and nobody spoke to his character".55 Ryder's
handling of reprieve and pardon matters was principled. He was
trying to take into account factors that ethical sentencing officers still
consult.
King faults Hay for using "a small number of quotations from [the
judges' reports to the monarch] to illustrate the importance of one
particular factor — the role of respectability or respectable connec-
tions . . .".56 To correct for that, King undertook to categorize all
the factors mentioned in all the cases in the state papers for the period
from 1784 to 1787. He identifies "five broad groups of factors", of
which the respectabihty of the convict turned out to be the Least
important. The most frequent was good character, including previous
good conduct. Although men of relatively high social standing sup-
plied some of these references, King found that "the great majority
of character witnesses were drawn from the middling sort or from the
poorer but respectable sections of the local community".
Next in order of frequency, he found, was the youth of the of-
fender, which reflected both sympathy and a belief in reformability.
Third, King says, came the circumstances of the crime, especially
whether violent. The fourth most commonly mentioned factor was
the poverty of the culprit and his family. A little of this may have had
to do with the desire to spare the ratepayers from having to support
an executed convict's family, but the more usual concern was to recog-
nize the lesser culpability of someone who acted in distress (and we
remember Dudley Ryder's sympathy for the destitute highway rob-
ber Thomas Rolf). Furthermore, King says, wealth hurt. Judges
were "very hard on prisoners who were relatively well off and could
not therefore plead poverty at the time of the crime". He quotes a
judge's report from a case in 1764, which says that it is better "that
one man in good circumstances should suffer than 20 miserable
wretches". Fifth and last in King's sample comes the factor Hay
stresses, the respectabihty of the convict or his parents. King's totals
for the five categories: (a) character and previous conduct, 126; (b)
youth, old age and infirmity, 61; (c) circumstances of the crime, 56;
(d) destitution or family poverty, 33; (e) respectabihty, 13. Radzi-
nowicz directed attention several decades ago to the prevalence of a
broad range of sentencing-type factors in the pardon process,57 and
5 3 Ryder Assize Diary, p. 13.
5 6 King, "Decision-Makers and Decision-Making in the 18th Century Criminal
Law", p. 22. The data quoted in text is from ibid., pp. 22-8.
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A staple of Marxist argumentation for dealing with contrary evi-
dence is what I call the legitimation trick. Evidence that cuts against
the thesis is dismissed as part of a sub-plot to make the conspiracy
more palatable to its victims, to legitimate it. The Hay essay contains
some splendid examples. Hay notices the pervasive legalism of Eng-
lish criminal procedure, including "the extreme solicitude of judges
for the rights of the accused, [in which contemporary visitors from
Europe saw such] a sharp distinction from the usual practice of con-
tinental benches".s8 Hay also mentions the tradition of strict con-
struction against penal statutes and the recurrent quashing of strong
prosecution cases for technical flaws. But Hay undertakes to reconcile
this attention to safeguard with his thesis by arguing: "When the
ruling class acquitted men on technicalities they helped instil a belief
in the disembodied justice of the law in the minds of all who watched.
In short, its very inefficiency, its absurd formalism, was part of its
strength as ideology".59
Now the question that comes to mind is, simply, how does one test
that proposition? A revealing manner, I think, is to hypothesize the
exact opposite facts. Suppose that the rulers of eighteenth-century
England had been operating banana-republic courts, coercing confes-
sions or lynching paupers without trial. Obviously, the ruling-class
conspiracy would be equally well evidenced. I have to ask, therefore,
what kind of thesis it is that can be satisfied by any state of the
evidence, and my answer is that it is not a thesis about the evidence,
which means that it is not a thesis about history as I understand the
discipline.
Consider another example, the celebrated case of Lord Ferrers,
who as Hay tells us "killed his steward, was captured by his tenantry,
tried in the House of Lords, sentenced to death, executed at Tyburn,
and dissected 'like a common criminal' as the publicists never tired
of repeating".60 Hay dismisses such events as "part of the lore of
politics that in England social class did not preserve a man even from
the extreme sanction of death".61 But suppose instead that Lord
Ferrers had been privileged to slay as many social inferiors as he
pleased, suppose, that is, that the English had immunized the elite
from capital punishment. Well, of course, that would fit the thesis
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just as conveniently. Consequently, the thesis is simply not testable.
It floats above the evidence, it is self-proving. I am reminded of the
way that some adherents of another economic-detenninist school, the
modern law-and-economics movement, are able to dismiss contrary
evidence: the market makes everything efficient, and anything that
is not is a consumption choice.
VII
THE STATUTES
Laying aside Hay's ruling-class conspiracy, what does explain the
eighteenth-century paradox — the profusion of capital statutes in an
era of declining capital punishment? I do not have a full answer, much
less a thesis with the elegance of Hay's. I can, however, point to some
factors that I believe bear on this great question.
My starting point is volume one of Radzinowicz's History of English
Criminal Law published in 1948.62 This work is not in fashion today,
for reasons that I do not understand. In my opinion the burst of
recent scholarship on eighteenth-century criminal procedure has
done little to detract from Radzinowicz's awesome book. Radzino-
wicz derived his account from the contemporary tracts and legal
literature, as well as from the parliamentary materials produced dur-
ing the course of the reform movement that became prominent in the
1770s and ran into the middle of the nineteenth century. Radzinowicz
observes that Eden and Romilly, the legendary proponents of reform,
followed the teaching of Beccaria and argued that punishment should
be proportioned to the gravity of the crime.63 (Blackstone advanced
similar ideas in the 1760s.64) Enghsh law was wrong, they said, to
invoke the death penalty for offences of vastly different seriousness.
Excessive severity was counter-productive, it weakened deterrence
by discouraging victims from prosecuting and by encouraging juries
to down-charge or acquit. Nevertheless, adherents of what Radzi-
nowicz calls the theory of maximum severity resisted the reformers'
manifestly sensible position well into the nineteenth century. These
people who supported the heavy Enghsh reliance on the threat of
capital punishment were preoccupied with the deterrent pohcy of the
criminal law, virtually to the exclusion of competing considerations
such as proportionality. Why? They argued — and I think they be-
lieved — that England was uniquely dependent upon the deterrent
effect of the capital threat because, alone of the great states of the
day, England had neither a professional police force nor the system
of non-capital sanctions known as penal servitude that had so widely
displaced the death penalty on the Continent.
62 Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, i.
63 Ibid., pp. 231 ff.
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A large chapter of English constitutional and administrative history
underlies the eighteenth-century aversion to professional police forces
and correction systems. Just as the prospect of a standing army
evoked shivers in those who thought back to the days of James II,
the suggestion that the police power in the localities be turned over
to a corps of hirelings raised alarm. A tyrant might use this force to
undercut or repress the liberties of the political community. The
administrative challenge of organizing police and correction systems
was also daunting to contemporaries. The English had scant experi-
ence in dealing with the problems of recruiting, training, financing,
leading and controlling such forces. Ultimately, of course, as the
urban-industrial age unfolded, the English had to abandon their at-
tachment to amateur law enforcement, but that was the work of the
next century; scarcely anyone foresaw it in the eighteenth century
when the capital legislation was expanding so greatly.
Radzinowicz emphasizes the sense of insecurity that resulted from
the want of effective policing.65 Contemporaries felt that they needed
every ounce of deterrence that they could get. They had to put so
much weight on deterrence because they had so little chance of catch-
ing and convicting the undeterred. If the fear of hanging deterred
some potential criminals, as most people thought it did, then the
capital threat was worth making. Likewise, the want of any alterna-
tive to the capital sanction better than transportation had a great
bearing on the extension of capital punishment to offences created in
the eighteenth century.
I think that Radzinowicz's account of the explosion of capital stat-
utes in an age of declining capital punishment has two major virtues
when contrasted with Hay's.66 First, Radzinowicz takes seriously the
evidence of the people who were near, and in some cases quite influ-
ential in, the legislative events. Contemporaries struggled for decades
over the relative merits of maximum severity versus proportionality,
and I am persuaded that we should listen to them. Second, Radzi-
nowicz has related his explanation to other, fundamental features of
the legal system — that is, to the weaknesses in detection and cor-
rections. In that respect the comparative dimension reinforces Rad-
zinowicz. A notable weakness of Hay's account is that he points to
ruling-class self-interest to explain a phenomenon that was distinc-
tively English. Other states of the day had comparable ruling classes,
yet the burgeoning of capital legislation in the later eighteenth century
was an English peculiarity.
65 Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, i, pp. 23-35, 248 ff-> 4 1 0 -
6 6 I should say, however, that I prefer Hay to Radzinowicz on the question of
whether, as Radzinowicz contends, the declining penal death rate of the later eight-
eenth century was frustrating a legislative preference for higher levels of enforcement.
Cf. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", p. 23, with Radzinowicz,
History of English Criminal Law, i, pp. 158-64, esp. p. 164. Belief in the deterrent
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I wish to point to two other peculiarities of the English criminal
justice system that help explain the burst of eighteenth-century capi-
tal legislation — benefit of clergy and the conceptual impoverishment
of the substantive law.
From the middle ages into the eighteenth century, the remarkable
institution of benefit of clergy underwent an incessant and contorted
transmutation.67 Originally a device for preserving ecclesiastical
criminal jurisdiction over clerics, it became by 1706 a privilege that
anyone convicted of a common law felony could claim in order to
obtain exemption from the imposition of the death penalty. Pursuant
to legislation of 1717, almost ah1 convicts who pleaded clergy after
that date were transported to the British colonies in America for a
seven-year term of indentured servitude. By the eighteenth century,
therefore, benefit of clergy had drained most of the blood from the
common law of crime. In order to preserve the capital threat for a
crime that had been or would have been capital under the common
law, special legislation had to be enacted making the offence non-
clergyable. Some such statutes date from the sixteenth century, and
a group of important ones appeared in the reigns of William and
Anne, but most were Georgian.68 Accordingly, the so-called expan-
sion of the capital sanction in the eighteenth century was to some
considerable extent only a restoration. This process of piecemeal res-
toration was a major force in the transformation of the law of crime
from a common law field to a predominantly statutory one.69
This movement from common law into statute law occurred in a
legal system that was ill-equipped to handle it. Milsom, speaking of
the late medieval period, overstates this point, but let me quote him
for the flavour of a notion that I think would repay careful study.
"The miserable history of [the law of] crime in England can be shortly
told. Nothing worthwhile was created".70 Many aspects of the Eng-
lish medieval heritage had the effect of reducing the legal-scientific
dimension of the criminal law by comparison with Continental law
— we might mention the heavy use of laymen to decide and to pros-
ecute criminal cases, the virtual absence of lawyers for prosecution
and defence, the tiny number of royal judges, the decentralization of
the assize system, and the opacity of the general verdict. English
criminal law was primitive in matters of offence definition, especially
6 7 See generally The Reports of Sir John Spelman, ed. J. H. Baker, 2 vols. (Selden
Soc., xciii-xciv, London, 1977-8), ii, Introduction, pp. 327-34; James F. Stephen, A
History of the Criminal Law of England, 3 vols. (London, 1883), i, pp. 458 ff. Hay
dismisses benefit of clergy in a footnote: Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal
Law", p. 22 n. 2.
6 8 See the convenient list of these statutes in Jerome Hall, Theft, Law and Society,
2nd edn. (Indianapolis, 1952), pp. 356-63.
6 9 See John Styles, "Criminal Records , Hist. Jl., xx (1977), pp. 977, 980.
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the general part, that set of notions about criminal responsibility that
cuts across ah1 criminal offences (for example, degrees of culpability,
the law of attempts, aiding and abetting, capacity, and most of the
affirmative defences). This underdevelopment of the scientific side
of English law greatly affected the multiplication of capital statutes.
The English did not have 200 separate crimes in the modern sense
that could be punished with death. Rather, they lacked general defi-
nitions, especially for larceny and embezzlement, with the result that
they were constantly having to add particulars in order to compensate
for the want of generality.71 The consolidation movement of the nine-
teenth century illustrates this point well; few offences were repealed,
rather definitions were improved so that the number of separate of-
fences could be reduced. Stephen, writing nearly a century ago, made
the point that the 160 capital offences that Blackstone complained
were in force in the 1760s "might probably be reduced by careful
classification to a comparatively small number".72
Not only did English criminal law lack scientific sophistication, on
the legislative side it had no central direction. No minister of justice
oversaw the administration and amendment of the criminal jus-
tice system. Most of the capital statutes, like most of the rest of
eighteenth-century legislation,73 originated as members' bills. In
such circumstances the extension of capital sanctions to new forms
of property was natural enough, by sheer force of analogy. If the
capital sanction suited offences against sheep under Elizabeth, then
why not factories under George III? "For once the death penalty is
established as the most effective instrument of crime-prevention",
Radzinowicz remarks, "there can be no valid reason for invoking it
to suppress one offence and not another".74 Some larger reform of
principle is needed to interrrupt that process. Legislatures incline to
err on the side of severity when considering particular offences. Par-
ticulars are inflationary, because there is no counter-constituency to
resist the analogy that extends penal sanctions from one thing to the
next. Leniency and proportionality are considerations that come to
the fore when a legislature has occasion to compare offences and
sanctions — when, for example, it produces a penal code, or (as in
nineteenth-century England) revises major segments of the law.
71 See, for example, Radzinowicz's succinct account of the succession of larceny
statutes: Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law, i, pp. 41-9.
72 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, i, p . 470.
73 "In the eighteenth century, legislation was not . . . especially a matter for the
ministers of the Crown. There was little government legislation apart from routine
financial measures . . .": P. D . G. Thomas , The House of Commons in the Eighteenth
Century (Oxford, 1971)1 P- 45- On the Treasury's oversight of revenue bills, see Sheila
Lambert, Bills and Acts: Legislative Procedure in Eighteenth-Century England (Cam-
bridge, 1971), pp . 71-4. See also Hugh Amory, "Henry Fielding and the Criminal
Legislation of 1751-a", Philol. Quart., 1 (1971), pp . 175, 191-2.
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We can, of course, trace the hand of commercial interests (who
were often more petty bourgeois than 61ite, as I have said before) in
a considerable fraction of the eighteenth-century criminal legislation,
both capital and non-capital. I doubt whether anyone would argue
with Jerome Hall's assessment that "it is in this century that one
comes upon the law of receiving stolen property, larceny by trick,
obtaining goods by false pretences, and embezzlement. Here, for the
first time, the modern lawyer finds himself in contact with a body of
substantive criminal law which he feels is essentially his own".73 New
forms of economic activity and commercial organization gave rise to
new issues of definition. Yet the very fact that the solutions that were
reached in the eighteenth century strike us as essentially modern (on
issues of culpability, that is, rather than sanction) suggests that these
measures were enacted because they were reasonable rather than be-
cause a ruling class wrested advantage from others. There is no social
interest in failing to criminalize receiving stolen property, larceny by
trick, obtaining goods by false pretences, and embezzlement. These
offences persist with only technical refinement in modern English




In a recent essay Richard Sparks makes a point that helps us under-
stand why the Hay thesis is so improbable.77 The criminal law, says
Sparks, is only important "at the margins of social life; . . . in day-
to-day affairs it is not all that important to the maintenance of late
industrial capitalism's social order . . . give me the law of contracts
(including contracts of employment), and you can have all the rest of
the statute book . . . the most generally useful laws are likely to be
the ones that define . . . ownership and control [of the means of
production], and not some ancillary laws that promise to thump
individuals for rather trivial kinds of tampering with those means".78
The criminal law is simply the wrong place to look for the active hand
of the ruling classes. From the standpoint of the rulers, I would
suggest, the criminal justice system occupies a place not much more
central than the garbage collection system. True, if the garbage is not
collected the society cannot operate and ruling-class goals will be
frustrated, but that does not turn garbage collection into a ruling-
73 Hall , Theft, Law and Society, pp. 34-5-
76 For example, Criminal Code oftke Hungarian People's Republic, trans. P. Lam berg
(Budapest, 1962), pp. 108, n o , ss. 292 (embezzlement) , 293 (criminal fraud), 301
(receiving goods unlawfully obtained).
77 Richard F . Sparks, "A Critique of Marxist Criminology", Crime and Justice: An
Annual Review of Research, ii (iofto), p. 159.
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class conspiracy. The Hay thesis, in a similar fashion, confuses neces-
sary and sufficient conditions.
In this paper I have been maintaining two themes about the ad-
ministration of the criminal law in the eighteenth century. First, most
of the discretion was exercised by people not fairly to be described as
the ruling class, especially the prosecutors and the jurors. Secondly,
the discretion that characterized this system was not arbitrary and
self-interested, but rather turned on the good-faith consideration of
factors with which ethical decision-makers ought to have been con-
cerned. The historian does not need a conspiracy theory to explain
the discretion, and the discretion does not fit the theory. I concede
fully that when men of the social 61ite came into contact with the
criminal justice system in any capacity, they were treated with special
courtesy and regard, just as they were elsewhere in this stratified
society. To seize upon that as the raison d'etre of the criminal justice
system is, however, to mistake the barnacles for the boat.
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